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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the Chilean experience with capital flows. We discuss the role played by capital
controls, financial regulations and the exchange rate regime. The focus is on the period after 1990,
the period when Chile returned to international capital markets. We also discuss the early 80s, where
a currency collapse triggered a financial crisis in Chile, despite stricter capital controls on inflows
than the 90s and tighter currency matching requirements on the banking sector. We conclude that
financial regulation and the exchange rate regime are at the center of capital inflows experiences and
financial vulnerabilities. Rigid exchange rates induce vulnerabilities, which may lead to sharp capital
account reversals. We also discuss three important characteristics of the Chilean experience since
the 90s. The first is the fact that most international borrowing is done directly by corporations and
it is not intermediated by the banking system. The second is the implication of the free trade
agreement of Chilean and the US regarding capital controls. Finally, we examine the Chilean
experience following the Asian-Russia crisis, showing that Chile did not suffer a sudden-stop, but
a current account reversal due to policy reactions and a sudden-start in capital outflows.
Kevin Cowan
Inter-American Development Bank









This paper discusses Chile’s experience with international borrowing over the last
two decades.  This period allows us to contrast the Chilean experience during two recent
episodes of capital flows to Latin America: the late 70s and the 90s.  The first episode
ended in disaster for Chile, with a Balance of Payments and financial crisis, and huge costs
in terms of output and employment.  Unlike other countries in the region, the crisis was not
caused by fiscal imbalances, but triggered by a deteriorating international environment, a
misaligned exchange rate and a weak financial system.  Indeed, it started before Mexico
announced that it could not meet its foreign obligations, which ignited the debt crisis.  In
many aspects the Chilean crisis of the early 80s resembles the more recent Asian crises, and
the so-called “twenty-first century crises.”
During the second episode of capital inflows Chile fared much better, and managed
to avoid the large financial collapses that afflicted many other emerging economies during
this period.  Following the 1980s crisis Chile experienced a sharp recovery, and between
1990 and 1997 was the recipient of massive capital inflows.  During this period, and in
order to stem net inflows, avoid a large appreciation and keep control of monetary policy,
the authorities implemented capital controls on inflows and liberalized outflows.  The most
widely cited control was the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on capital inflows,
the encaje.
1  Because of the resiliency of the Chilean economy to the events following the
tequila crisis in Mexico and the Asian-Russian crisis of the late 90s this policy has received
a lot of attention in both academic and policy circles.  Finally, after mounting currency
pressures in 1998 and a recession in 1999 capital controls were eliminated.
The late 70s and early 80s provide a good control group against which to evaluate
the financial integration and macroeconomic developments of the Chilean economy during
the 90s.  For a start, capital controls on inflows were much stricter before the 1982 crisis
than during the 90s.  In addition, financial regulation requiring banks to match the currency
composition of their income and liabilities to avoid exposure to exchange rate risk was very
similar in 1982 to that in place in the 1990s.  Neither avoided the collapse of the corporate
sector, which in turn contaminated the financial system.  Clearly explanations for the lower
                                                
1 We use indistinctly URR and encaje.2
vulnerability of the Chilean economy must lie beyond capital controls and mismatch
regulation.
In this paper we argue that the resilience of the Chilean economy during the 90s was
mainly due to: (i) changes in banking regulation that promoted a solid financial system (in
particular changes in regulation for related lending) and, (ii) to the absence of currency risk
guarantees to the private sector.  These in turn induced more prudent indebtedness policies
by corporations, which as a result were well equipped to tolerate the exchange rate
fluctuations of the late 90s.  We argue in the paper that a rigid exchange rate system
contributes to capital inflows by reducing the risk of arbitraging existing interest rate
differentials.  There is no evidence that capital controls were able to reduce these inflows,
although there is evidence that they had a limited effect on the composition of these flows.
In a nutshell, we conclude that flexibility in exchange rate management and a sound
financial system are more important than capital controls in protecting the economy from
external shocks and fluctuations in the availability of international capital.
There are a series of additional characteristics of Chile’s international borrowing
that are worth examining.  One of these is the secondary role played by the banking sector
in intermediating foreign credit.  In contrast other countries with similar levels of economic
development, non-financial corporations did most of the international borrowing in Chile
during the 90s.  We do not have arguments to say whether this is a positive or negative
development.  On the one hand it isolates the financial system from financial turmoil.  On
the other hand it limits access of smaller firms to foreign funds.  This second aspect
becomes more important in the presence of a solid financial system.
Finally, there is the issue of whether Chile can introduce capital controls after
signing a free trade agreement with the US.  Although there is some loss of degrees of
freedom to apply controls, the option, although limited, still remains.
The paper proceeds as follows.  The second section describes foreign debt and the
international investment position for Chile over the last quarter century.  Section 3
discusses the issue of capital controls, focusing on the effects of the unremunerated reserve
requirement, the  encaje.  We explore a new issue, namely the composition between
financial and non-financial borrowing.  We show, from an international perspective, that
while capital controls were in place in Chile the composition of external debt tilted toward3
the non-financial sector.  Then, section 4 follows with a discussion on banking regulation
and international borrowing.  As we argue, the exchange rate regime is the key, and the
examination of the effects of exchange rate regimes on debt inflows in the 90s are
discussed in section 5, whilst section 6 focuses on currency mismatches.  Section 7
discusses the implications for Chile of the recently signed free trade agreement with the
US.  Finally, section 8 analyzes the Chilean experience following the Asian-Russia crisis,
where we dispute the view that Chile had a sudden stop.  As we discuss in the section,
Chile had a current account reversal due to an initially large current account deficit and a
negative terms of trade shock, which induced the authorities to follow a very tight monetary
policy and a strong defense of the peso.  We conclude that from the capital account point of
view, the reversal was a sudden-start of outflows rather than a sudden-stop of capital
inflows.  Section 9 concludes.
2. Stylized Facts
In this section we provide an overview of the evolution of Chilean international
borrowing and capital flows.  We start with the early eighties, as this period provides a
good (or a bad) benchmark against which to evaluate the evolution of international
financial integration during the 90s.
2.1 The Evolution of External Debt
Prior to the debt crisis of 1982 Chile’s external debt was approximately 14 billion
dollars, slightly less than 50% of GDP (figures 1 and 2).  Then, between 1982 and 1985,
external debt grew moderately in dollar terms, but sharply in terms of GDP as a result of
the depreciation of the Chilean peso and a large fall in output during the debt crisis.
External debt peaked at 120% of GDP in 1986.  In the second half of the 80s Chile’s
external debt remained relatively stable in dollar terms, while output growth helped bring
the debt to GDP ratio down to 60% of GDP by 1989.
As a result of renewed access to international capital markets external debt went
from 21 billion dollars at the beginning of the 90s to 35 billion dollars in 1999.  Most of
this growth took place in the second half of the decade.  In recent years, debt has continued
to grow in dollar terms, reaching 43 billion dollars in December 2003.  Although foreign4
debt has doubled in dollar terms since 1990 as a fraction of GDP it still remains below its
1989 level.
Prior to the debt crisis, most of Chile’s external debt was private (about 60%).
Following the crisis, and in order to successfully renegotiate external debt, private debt
received public guarantees.  In addition, most of new foreign borrowing was done by the
public sector.  This caused a large drop in the share of private debt, which bottomed out at
17% of total external debt in 1987.  Later, Chile’s return to international financial markets
and voluntary lending combined with sound public finances (the fiscal accounts where in
surplus until 1999) drove the share of the private sector in total external debt up 84% in
2000.  Subsequently, as a result of the slow down in economic activity and mild fiscal
deficits, the share of public debt has increased slightly, rising from 16% of the total stock in
2000 to 20% in 2003.
Another characteristic of Chilean private sector external debt is that most of it is
non-financial (figure 3), i.e. not intermediated by the domestic financial system.  Firms
borrow directly from abroad, skipping the domestic financial system.  Caballero et al.
(2004) stress this point when comparing Australia and Chile, and their relative resilience to
external shocks.  In the case of Australia, banks do most of the foreign borrowing, which is
then is intermediated to the domestic economy.  Accordingly, Caballero et al.  (2004) argue
that international borrowing done by banks allows access to international capital markets to
a broader set of borrowers, which may in turn explain Australia’s different response to the
large negative terms of trade shocks following the Asian crisis.
This has not always been the case.  In 1975, as Chile began opening to international
capital markets, private debt was only 786 million dollars.  Because of severe restrictions
on foreign borrowing by domestic banks (discussed in detail below), only 20% of this
private debt was financial.  Restrictions on international borrowing for domestic banks
were gradually lifted during the late 70s and early 80s, and private debt grew massively,
specially banking debt.  In 1981 private external debt was close to 10 billion dollars, two
thirds of which was owed by the banking system.
Foreign borrowing by the domestic banking system and the mismatches it generated
was at the center of the financial crisis of 1982.  Interestingly, it was not the banks that
were mismatched, but their corporate borrowers.  Banks were forced to lend in foreign5
currency all that they had borrowed in foreign currency (Edwards and Cox-Edwards, 1991).
The result was large dollar denominated bank debts in the balance sheets of domestic firms,
many of which operated in the non-tradeable sector.
2.2 The Evolution of the International Investment Position
Chile’s foreign liabilities in 1980 were about 16.5 billion dollars, out of which 12.7
billion dollars corresponded to external debt and the rest to foreign direct investment
(figure 4 and table 1)
2.  Most of the liabilities were in the form of external debt, the
standard pattern of capital flows prior to the debt crisis. The composition of foreign
liabilities started to change in the late 80s and early 90s, when foreign direct investment
started to play a much more important role.  While in 1985 total foreign direct investment
represented 15% of total liabilities, in 1990 its share was up to 34%, and currently it
represents 53%.  External debt, in contrast, has reduced its importance, falling from close to
two-thirds in 1990 to less than half in 2002.  Portfolio investment makes up only 13% of
total liabilities.
From 1990 to 2002 total external liabilities increased from 31 to 84 billion dollars.
As shown in figure 5, foreign assets also increased significantly during this period, rising
from 16 to 56 billion dollars.  As a result, the net liability position (line IIP in the figure)
has grown by considerably less than total foreign liabilities, remaining between 35 and 45%
of GDP since 1990.  On the other hand, financial integration (measured as the sum of assets
and liabilities over GDP) has increased substantially during the 1990s, rising from 140% of
GDP in 1990 to 206% in 2002.
An important development regarding Chile’s international investment position is the
increased relevance of pension funds in international assets.  Pension funds have gradually
been allowed to increase the foreign share of their portfolio, so that currently about 30% of
total pension funds are invested abroad (figure 6).  Because of the size of the accumulated
savings in the funds-- about 50% of GDP-- this has made a significant difference in the
                                                
2 The figures on the international investment position being constructed by the IMF are divided into foreign
direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and other.  In the liability side most external debt is included in
“other”, but in the other items part of debt is also include.  For example, debt associated with FDI projects are6
composition of the country’s international assets, which shows up in portfolio investment in
the assets side of table 1.  The logic for the gradual opening up of the investment abroad by
pension funds was two-fold.  On the one hand, lifting restrictions allowed for greater
portfolio diversification.  On the other it was initially meant to encourage capital outflows
in a period of continuous real exchange rate appreciation
3.
Although its net international investment position is similar to that of other
emerging markets Chile is more financially integrated  (figure 7).  In terms of composition
of assets, Chile has more portfolio investment than other emerging markets, mainly because
of the activity of pension funds.  It has also more reserves.  In terms of liabilities the share
of FDI in Chile is one of the largest amongst emerging markets and high-income
economies.  External debt as fraction of GDP is slightly larger than that of emerging
markets and significantly less than that of advanced economies.  Another important
characteristic of Chile’s recent international borrowing is that foreign companies owe most
external debt.  Indeed, in 2002 foreign companies owed 57% of total private debt.  This
shows that degrees of vulnerability of Chile are much less than those indicated by external
debt figures.
4
3. Capital Controls: The encaje
Following the surge in capital flows to emerging markets in the early 90s, Chilean
authorities imposed controls on capital inflows while gradually liberalizing capital
outflows.
5 The stated purpose of this policy was to reduce net inflows and stem the
appreciation of the Chilean peso.
The main instrument used to limit inflows, widely discussed in policy circles, was
an unremunerated reserve requirement known as the encaje.  The encaje required that a
                                                                                                                                                    
included in FDI, while bond issuance by residents are included in external debt figures, but in international
investment statistics is part of portfolio investment since they are tradeable instruments.
3 The exchange rate pressures of the outflows of pension funds has been minor, since by regulation they must
have low currency exposure, so that in practice they have been investing abroad fully hedging their currency
exposure.  This is one of the factors behind the development of the FX derivative market in Chile (De
Gregorio and Tokman, 2004).
4 For further details see Jadresic et al. (2003).
5As part of the effort to increase outflows, years required for foreign investors to remit capital and profits
were slowly reduced and finally eliminated.  Pension funds limits to invest abroad were also widened.  For
details on the main measures taken since 1990 see Appendix 1.  See also Gallego et al. (1999).7
fraction of the capital inflow be deposited in a non-interest bearing account in the Chilean
Central bank.  The encaje was introduced in June 1991, and was expanded and extended
various times in the following years.  Initially, it was set at 20% of the inflow, for a period
from 3 months to 12 months depending on the maturity and the nature of the credit.  Trade
credit was excluded from the encaje
6.  Later, in 1992 and then in 1995, the base was
broadened to include foreign currency deposits and the proceeds from the issuance of
ADR’s (American Depository Receipts), the rate was increased to 30%, and the period was
set at 12 months regardless of the term of the credit.  The encaje was reduced and finally
eliminated in 1998.
7
There were several reasons given for introducing the encaje.  The most prominent
was the need to reduce net capital inflows to prevent an appreciation of the Chilean peso.
Indeed, a depreciated real exchange rate was considered a key factor behind the successful
recovery of the economy that had taken place since the mid 1980s.  In addition, it was
argued that capital controls would allow for some degree of monetary policy independence
in the context of a managed exchange rate, which for most of the 90s was an exchange rate
band with adjustable width and a crawling central parity (figure 8).  Finally, since the cost
of the encaje was proportionally higher for short-term inflows, it was argued that it would
reduce the vulnerability of the economy to “hot capital”.
An assessment of the macroeconomic consequences of the encaje requires looking
at its effect on: interest rates, level and composition of capital flows and the exchange rate.
8




In theory the existence of an encaje should allow for differences between domestic
and foreign interest rates without inducing capital flows to restore a non-arbitrage
                                                
6 De Gregorio et al (2000) argue that the encaje gradually lost power, as markets came up with ways to
circumvent it. The most obvious way to overcome the encaje, frequently cited but not quantified, was to
register short-term credit as trade credit.
7 Before its elimination the rate of the reserve requirement was set to zero.8
condition.  Assuming full compliance, and an international interest rate of 7%,  a 30%
encaje for a year leads to a differential of about 3 percentage points on a one-year inflow.
In practice, however, the impact on interest rates is likely to be considerably smaller – as
agents switch to longer maturities or find ways of circumventing the encaje.
What then are the empirical estimates of the effect of the encaje on domestic interest
rates? Using a VAR framework, De Gregorio et al. (2000) found that the effect on the
interest rate was both small and short lived.  In the first 6 months after a change in the
encaje regulation – which the authors interpret as closing an existing loophole – they find
effects that range between 90 and 150bp for a 30% encaje.  This effect dies out slowly over
a 12-month horizon.  This result lies at the upper range of the estimated effects of the
controls on interest rates in Chile.  Smaller effects are reported in Edwards (1999), while
Gallego et al.  (1999) found no effects whatsoever.
Level of Inflows
The Chilean economy received massive capital inflows during the 1990s, and there
is no solid evidence showing that they would have been substantially larger if the encaje
had not been implemented. Indeed, most existing empirical studies find no effects of the
encaje on the level of capital inflows.  The only exception is a study by Gallego et al.
(1999), who find that a 100 bp increase in the cost of the encaje reduces total capital
inflows by 1% of GDP.  In addition, they find that those flows directly affected by the
encaje would decline by 2% of GDP, which indicates that the composition across maturities
of international borrowing was affected.  It is important to note that this effect is computed
for the stock of foreign liabilities.  Given that the total cost of the  encaje, using the
estimates of Gallego et al.  (1999), was on average between 100 and 200 bp, the reserve
requirement reduced total inflows by at most 2% of GDP.  This is relatively small,
considering that total net inflows during the whole period from 1991 until 1997 were
approximately 27% of GDP.
                                                                                                                                                    
8 The review of the evidence is mainly focused on De Gregorio et al. (2000).  See also Soto and Valdes-Prieto
(1996), Edwards (1999), Gallego et al (1999), and Nadal de Simone y Sorsa (1999).9
Composition of Inflows
By taxing short-term flows more heavily, one would expect that the maturity of
capital inflows should increase.  Indeed, existing evidence shows that the encaje led to
longer-term external debt.  As column (1) in table 2 shows, in the mid 1990s, as capital
controls were tightened, short-term debt declined sharply as percentage of total debt.
According to De Gregorio et al.  (2000) the total effect of the encaje on short-term debt
would have been between 0.5 and 1 percentage points of GDP, which would have resulted
in a lower stock of short-term debt about 600 million dollars.
From a vulnerability perspective it usually makes sense to look at trade credit
separately from other forms of short-term credit, as trade credit are advances on exports and
therefore less volatile.  In the Chilean case, however, this distinction may be blurred by the
fact that short-term debt was registered as trade credit as a way of evading the encaje.  With
this in mind column (3) shows the evolution of an expanded definition of short-term debt
that includes trade credit.  Here the effects of the encaje, mentioned above, are not that
clear.  Most of the decline in short-term debt takes place between 1997 and 1999, a couple
of years after the encaje was tightened.
Exchange Rate
During most of the 90s, the nominal exchange rate in Chile was allowed to fluctuate
within a band.  In several occasions the width as well as the center of the band were
adjusted (figure 8).  The first change was the widening of the band from –5% to –10%.
Later, in 1997, it was widened again to –12.5%.  The center of the band was adjusted
several times, most notably; it was revalued in early 1992, late 1994 and early 1997.
Finally, in the eve of the Asian crisis and motivated by fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart,
2002), the band was narrowed.  Several changes finally led to eliminating the band and
moving to a flexible exchange rate regime in December 1999.
9
Both the exchange rate policy and the encaje tried to avoid an appreciation in the
context of massive capital inflows.  Casual observation suggests that they failed to do so
(figure 9).  From 1990 until late 1997 the real exchange rate appreciated persistently.  The
most appreciated level occurred in 1997, a year in which net capital inflows, excluding
                                                
9 For further details see De Gregorio and Tokman (2004).10
reserves, were 9.1% of GDP, accumulation of reserves amounted to 3.3% of GDP and the
encaje was in full application.
Of course, the correct counterfactual is to determine the marginal effect of the
encaje on the real exchange rate.  We turn to this next.  The first empirical study on the
effects of the encaje (Soto and Valdes-Prieto, 1996), as well as most subsequent work, has
focused on determining whether it was effective in avoiding an appreciation of the peso.
All of the existing studies mentioned so far in this section – spanning a broad set of
measures, periods and empirical specifications -- fail to find an effect of the encaje on the
path of the real exchange rate.
Financial Vulnerability
In 1998 the Chilean peso suffered three rounds of speculative attacks.  These
turbulences were fought off with large hikes in interest rates and massive intervention in the
foreign exchange market.  As a result of this intervention, and a series of negative external
shocks, in 1999 the economy suffered its first recession in many years.  However, the fall in
output was small in comparison to other countries that also experienced sudden stops in
capital inflows in the late 90s.  Furthermore, Chile in 1999 did not face a financial crisis.
This has led many observers to argue that the presence of the  encaje reduced Chile’s
external vulnerability and was central to the mild recession.  After all, it reduced the share
of short-term debt, a variable that many authors have singled out as an important source of
financial vulnerability
10.
The problem with this view is that the magnitude of the estimated effects of the
encaje on the level and composition of capital flows during the 90s make it hard to believe
that capital controls were central to Chile’s economic success during the nineties.
Furthermore, Chile’s experience in the early 80s shows that, even if capital controls are
effective in limiting the share of short term debt, this certainly does not provide a guarantee
against currency crises.
                                                
10 A recent literature, motivated by events in East Asia, has argued that short term external debt may be an
important source of macroeconomic vulnerability.  Proponents of this view include Radelet and Sachs (1998)
and Chang and Velasco (1999), who argue that excessive reliance on short-term debt leaves emerging-market
corporations vulnerable to "financial panic" as in the stylized model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In this
context, policies like the encaje have the potential to reduce vulnerability by leghthening the tenor of the
external debt contracts.11
The Chilean 1982 crisis was a full-blown twin crisis (currency and financial).
Starting from a closed capital account, legislation passed early in 1974 allowed Chilean
non-financial firms and individuals to borrow abroad.  However, inflows were restricted to
maturities greater than 6 months.  In April 1976, and concerned with the destabilizing
effects of short-term capital inflows, Chilean authorities further lengthened this minimum
maturity to two years.  The minimum maturity restriction was to stay in place up to the debt
crisis in 1982.  In 1979 an additional restriction on short debt was introduced: an
unremunerated reserve requirement (an encaje) was put in place on all foreign loans shorter
than 65 months.
11  As a result of these stringent controls, short-term debt in 1981 was only
19% of total debt.  This did not prevent a severe crisis, however, with output declines of
13.6% in 1982 and 2.8% in 1983.
12
3.2 Microeconomic Effects
The available evidence shows that, at best, the effects of the  encaje on capital
inflows, interest rates and the exchange are small.  Furthermore, the estimated magnitudes,
and the events of 1982, suggest that it is no panacea against currency and financial crisis.
So much for the benefits.  What about the costs?
Differential Effects Across Firm Size
The microeconomic distortions that the encaje introduces are an issue frequently
ignored in the evaluation of capital controls in Chile.  If and when it worked, the main
effects of the encaje was to push the domestic cost of capital –in particular short-term
capital-- above its international opportunity cost.  This presumably had differential effects
across firms depending on their ability to obtain long-term financing abroad.  Forbes (2003)
takes this issue to the data, by analyzing the behavior of investment of publicly listed
companies.  She shows that during the period that the encaje prevailed, smaller firms faced
a higher cost of capital and less investment.  She interprets this as a cost of the encaje.
                                                
 
11 This reserve requirement ranged from 25%, for loans shorter that 36 months, to 10% for loans between 48
and 65 months in maturity. Trade credit was excluded.  See Edwards and Cox-Edwards (1991).
12 One of the reasons behind the collapse was the weakness of corporate sector balance sheets to tolerate a
massive exchange rate adjustment, which ultimately contaminated a poorly regulated banking system.  We
will return to this issue with further detail in section 6.12
Although suggestive, we believe that this result must be interpreted cautiously.
Although the encaje was clearly a variable that distinguished the periods analyzed, there are
other factors that could also explain the differences in firm behavior across size.  One of
these were restrictions placed on international bond issuance.  During the 1990s,
regulations requiring a minimum size and credit rating for international bond issues
effectively excluded many smaller firms from the international bond market
13.  These limits
were gradually relaxed, so that in 1998 the minimum rating was lowered to BBB- and the
minimum size reduced to 5 million dollars.
Differential Effects on Financial Sector
As mentioned in section 2, an interesting characteristic of the Chilean economy in
the 1990s is the direct external indebtedness of corporations, with domestic banks playing a
minor role in intermediating international debt.  To see whether this is Chilean quirk or a
feature common to other emerging economies, we explore whether banks in Chile
intermediate a relatively low share of international debt in comparison  to other economies
at similar levels of development.  To do so we look at the behavior of bank and non-bank
debt inflows for a sample of capital importing countries during the nineties.  For each
country we calculate the average ratio of bank inflows over total debt inflows over two
periods: 1990-96 and 2000-03.  We exclude the period 1997-99, as it is a period of
substantial changes in the regulations affecting the Chilean capital account, and also a
period of substantial instability in aggregate capital flows.  We then regress the ratio of
bank inflows to total debt inflows against a broad measure of development, the log of GDP
per capita (PPP at the beginning of each period).  We also include a dummy for Chile, an
interaction of the Chile dummy with a dummy for the second period, and the second period
dummy itself.
The results are shown in table 3.  The basic result of column (1) shows that the
estimated coefficient on the income variable is positive and significant: banks play a larger
role in intermediating capital inflows in high-income economies (which we interpret as
countries with more highly developed financial systems).  More importantly, the Chilean
dummy is negative, significant and sizeable.  The share of bank inflows in total debt
                                                
13 Corporations required a rating equal or more than sovereign risk and the minimum size of borrowing was
set at 50 million dollars13
inflows in Chile is 20% lower than the level predicted by its income level in the period
1990-96.  This difference disappears in the latter period, as indicated by the positive and
significant coefficient on the interaction between the Chile dummy and the second period
dummy.  This result is robust to changes in the sample (column 2), using a direct measure
of financial development (bank credit over GDP, again at the beginning of each period in
column 3) and an alternative measure of capital inflows (columns 4-6).
A possible explanation of this finding is that closely monitored banks found it
harder to avoid paying the encaje than corporations, so that the effective cost of foreign
credit for banks was higher.  If this were the case, the encaje would have had important
distributional effects across firms.  Small firms (reliant on short term bank credit) would
have born the brunt of the encaje, while large firms (able to borrow in international markets
or to evade the encaje), would have been relatively unaffected.
An alternative explanation is in the recent development of the Chilean derivatives
market.  As we mentioned above, Caballero et al. (2004) find that in Australia a large share
of foreign debt is intermediated by banks.  They also find that banks lend most of these
funds in Australian dollars, and use the derivatives market to hedge their positions.  Indeed,
banks in Australian are the largest holders of net currency derivative positions.  This being
the case, the development of the Chilean derivatives markets in the last few years is a
possible explanation for the increased role of banks in international debt flows.
Finally, changes in capital account regulations after 1998 (discussed in the
appendix), in particular those changes pertaining bond issue may also have played a part in
switching the mix away from direct international borrowing towards bank intermediated
foreign borrowing.  Currently, as a result of some combination of market development, the
consolidation of a flexible exchange rate regime and further liberalization of bank
borrowing, the composition of Chile’s private external debt is not significantly different to
what would be predicted according to international patterns.
4. Bank Regulations, International Borrowing and Financial
Crises
We show above that banks in Chile during the 90s intermediated a relatively low
share of international debt inflows – with most international borrowing done directly by14
corporations.  We also show that in the years after the capital account was fully liberalized
and the exchange rate floated, banks have begun playing a significantly larger role in debt
inflows.  There are two opposing views on the benefits and risks of this increased
participation of banks in international capital flows.  On the one hand, Caballero et al.
(2004) have argued that the larger role that banks in Australia play in international
borrowing vis-à-vis Chilean banks, allows the economy greater resilience to external
demand shocks by enhancing access to international capital, especially to firms and
consumers that do not have direct access to the international capital markets.  The Chilean
experience in 1982, on the other hand, suggests exactly the opposite: large foreign
liabilities on bank balance sheets can become a source of vulnerability.  If currency risk is
not correctly managed by the banking system, a large devaluation can lead to a financial
crisis
14.
We think that both arguments have a case.  The optimality of increased
intermediation of capital flows by domestic banks depends crucially on the incentives
banks have for correctly managing aggregate risk – in particular exchange rate risk – and
the tools available for the banks to manage such risks.  Banking regulation and
macroeconomic policy both have a direct impact on bank’s incentives to hedge against
exchange rate uncertainty.  The ability to contract foreign debt in the domestic currency, a
well developed domestic currency debt market that is both liquid and covers a broad range
of maturities, and the development of a derivatives markets are all tools that allow banks to
take on foreign debt without necessarily taking on exchange rate risk.
15  In this section we
concentrate on the importance of bank regulation.  In the following section we turn our
attention to exchange rate policy, and it’s effect on debt inflows.
Banking regulation has played a key role in determining the size and nature of
capital inflows to Chile.  As mentioned above, capital controls in Chile in the early 80s
were more stringent than those in mid nineties.  Bank regulation, however, was radically
different.  In what follows of this section, we look at bank regulation in the early 80s, and
                                                
14 For recent discussion on the negative affects of international borrowing in the context of a fragile banking
system see Soto (2000).
15 A series of papers, adressing the issue of domestic financial dollarization, have also made this point.  This
literature emphasizes the interactions between exchange rate regimes and bank regulations in determining the
share of domestic bank contracts denominated in foreign currencies.  IADB (2005) contains a recent survey.15
argue that it played an important part in the large capital inflows, banking mostly, of the
period and the resulting financial crisis.
16
Following a period of state control and financial repression, a series of measures
thrust the Chilean financial system into the free-market arena in the second half of the 70s.
In May 1974 financieras (finance houses) were authorized to operate, and to freely fix
interest rates.  Commercial banks, mostly state controlled, still had fixed rates and quantity
controls.  Then, in April 1975 banks were allowed to freely determine interest rates.
During this year, over 86% of state owned banks were privatized.  Hence, by the time of
full capital account opening in April 1980, Chilean banks had been operating in a free
market system for no more than five years.  In Chile domestic financial liberalization
happened before international financial opening, but the former was far from well done, as
we discuss below.
Initially there was no explicit deposit insurance in Chile, and authorities advocated a
market oriented banking system in which depositor monitoring would avoid excessive risk
taking by banks.  However, In December of 1976, a series of financieras defaulted on their
deposits.  This led to the intervention of the Banco Osorno, which was at the center of a
large business group.  The government bailed out 100% of the deposits of the troubled
financieras.  In addition, an explicit deposit guarantee of ~2500US per depositor was put in
place.  A series of authors have argued that the bailout of the financieras led to the belief
that all deposits would be guaranteed (see Arellano 1983, Velasco 1991, and De la Cuadra
and Valdés-Prieto, 1992).  There were also official statements from authorities that
reinforced this idea.  This belief would explain why, despite repeated problems with banks
and financieras in the late 1970s, there never was a substantial run on deposits in Chile
(Velasco 1991)
Rules setting prudential constraints on lending and investment portfolios and those
forcing timely disclosure of accurate information evolved slowly over the period 1975 to
1982.  In addition, the government recognized its limited enforcement capacity, so that
many rules (in particular those related to related lending) were poorly enforced. Early
legislation (1975) setting a maximum individual holding of bank property at 3% was
                                                
16 For a recent discussion on the development of the Chilean financial market since the 80s, see Cifuentes et
al. (2002).16
discarded after extensive abuse.  As a result recently privatized banks were purchased by
existing and new grupos (conglomerates).  It was only after 3 large banks and series of
financieras (which together made up 8% of deposits) went into crisis in late 1981 that limits
on related lending were introduced.  However, no consideration was made in these limits
for firm ownership structure, so that binding limits on related lending were really only
introduced in 1982.  The result was highly concentrated lending.   For example, Arellano
(1983) argues that one of the causes of the Fluxa group intervention was the high
concentration of assets, mostly to related companies (see also Moulian and Vergara 1979).
Evaluating the health of a bank therefore required information not only on the bank
itself, but also on the financial health of the conglomerate.  Information available to
depositors was also limited by the slow implementation of loan risk classification rules by
regulators.  Although the SBIF was authorized to classify loans by risk as early as January
1978, it did not issue specific rules for this classification until February 1980 and did not
fully enforce classification until 1982.
At the same time as the lack of risk classification mechanisms, and cross ownership
made private monitoring extremely costly, the growing belief of full deposit insurance
lowered the incentives for this monitoring.  Compounding the problem, legislation setting
prudential constraints on lending and investment portfolios evolved slowly and in some
cases was weakly enforced by a government.  The presumption was that private monitoring
and legislation classifying managers’ actions as fraud (punishable by prison terms) was
enough to limit excessive risk taking by banks.  As argued by Barandiarán and Hernandez
(1999) the government was keen for the financial sector to help reactivate economy, hence
“rules on collateral were simple and many loans were not properly secured, rules on non-
performing loans and loss provisions were below international standards, rules for asset
classification were only implemented gradually.” Capital adequacy ratios existed (5% of
liabilities) but their effectiveness was limited by a weak asset classification system.
Another factor that was indicative of the large distress that was incubating the
financial system was the high interest rates, as well as spreads between lending and
borrowing rates.  At the time of the liberalization real loan rates climbed to more than 60%,
which by 1980 had declined to 12%.  But as the crisis was emerging, real loan rates
increased sharply to 39% in 1981 and 35% in 1982, even with a fully open capital account.17
One could think that there could be an overshooting at the early stages of the financial
liberalization (De la Cuadra and Valdés-Prieto, 1992).  Although it is not easy to rationalize
the magnitudes in Chile, more difficult is to argue that this was the case in the early 1980s.
Nor one can explain the high rates by a peso problem.
17  The most likely factor was the
rollover of bad loans made by banks, which was due to the expected bailout that banks
perceived as financial fragility was growing, a problem that was exacerbated by related
lending.
All in all, it is not possible to determine how much of the ensuing credit growth was
the result of “excessive” risk taking by banks.  What is clear, however, is that the incentives
for risky behavior by banks were present and that prudential regulation was weak and
unable to avoid this conduct.  Legislation had to be modified continuously as regulators
became aware of highly concentrated lending patterns and risky loans.  This was not a
healthy financial system that collapsed because of the large external shocks that hit the
economy in the early 80s: prior to 1983, the country had already seen two episodes of
substantial banking distress.
The flip side of the lending boom were large capital inflows to the banking sector.
As we mentioned above, international borrowing financed a substantial share of bank
lending in the early 80s.  After 1980, banks had open access to international capital
markets.  With their funding base suddenly expanded, banks intermediated large volumes
of foreign debt – all of which was denominated in dollars.  By regulation banks were
required to “match” the currency composition of their liabilities with their assets, and hence
lent sizeable amounts to local firms in dollar-indexed debt.  This matching did not mean
however, that banks were not exposed to large systemic risks due to currency exposure.  It
simply meant that the risk was shifted to the corporate balance sheets.  Banks traded
currency risk for systemic default risk.  We return to the evidence on mismatch in section 7.
Independently of whether they were aware of this risk or not, bank regulators had a
limited ability to deal with it because of the existing exchange rate system.  How could
banks set provisions or cap exposure for exchange rate risk if Central Bank authorities (by
fixing the exchange rate) were committing to eliminating this risk completely?
                                                
17 See Velasco (1991) for further discussion and additional references.18
In the end, some combination of excessive idiosyncratic risk (due to bank moral
hazard) and systemic risk (due to large exchange rate exposure) precipitated the financial
crisis.  The interaction of a poor financial regulation and the systemic risk generated by a
fixed exchange rate were key determinants of this outcome.
5. Exchange Rate Regimes and International Borrowing
An interesting fact in the Chilean experience is that the large inflows of 1996-1997
occurred in the presence of massive reserve accumulation, a commitment to a (relatively)
stable exchange rate, and capital controls.  As discussed above existing evidence indicated
that capital controls did not have a major impact on these inflows.  In this section we turn to
another aspect of the Chilean policy mix that we argue did play a central role in the Chilean
international borrowing experience – the exchange rate regime.
Standard approaches to international capital flows assume risk neutrality across the
board, and therefore focus exclusively on uncovered interest parity (or the failure of it) as
an explanation for capital movements.  However, if borrowers in emerging markets are risk
averse, then the decision to borrow from abroad will depend not only on the expected
interest rate differential between domestic and foreign loans, but also on the variance of
debt service payments in the domestic currency.  All else equal, a more volatile nominal
exchange rate (or real exchange rate if the relevant variance is of real peso values of debt
payments) will make dollar borrowing relatively less attractive to risk adverse local
borrowers whose income is denominated in the local currency.  The role of the “currency
mismatch” implicit in this argument has received extensive attention in the recent literature
on the balance-sheet effects of currency mismatches, and their role in recent financial crisis.
Firms or consumers, faced with a large depreciation and unhedged dollar-liabilities
experience a negative net-worth shock, which leads to lower output, investment or
consumption.
18
All else equal we should expect that firms and consumers take these balance sheet
effects into consideration when choosing the level and currency composition of their
foreign debt.  If currency composition is not a choice, as is indeed the case for most
                                                
18 Krugman (1999a,b) presents a stylized version of this effect, while Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001)
and Céspedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) incorporate this mechanism into more fully articulated models.19
emerging market economies (see Eichengreen et al 2004), then for a given expected interest
rate differential between foreign and domestic debt, the level of foreign debt will be
decreasing in the expected variance of the exchange rate.
This implies that countries with credible fixed or managed exchange rates should,
all else equal, experience larger debt inflows.  Furthermore, even if the fixed exchange rate
is not credible, it may still have a positive effect on inflows if agents believe that an
exchange rate pre-commitment makes a government bailout in the case of a devaluation
more likely or prevents banking regulation from explicitly addressing exchange rate risk.
In the previous section we discussed how this might have operated in the banking system in
Chile in the early 80s, where regulators had their hands tied when it came to regulating the
risks arising from dollar lending.  Similar concerns have been expressed for the case of
Argentina, where dollarization also extended to domestic debt contracts.  Beyond the
banking system, the preferential exchange rate agreements put in place after the Chilean
crisis in 1982 are one form of such a bailout: dollar indebted firms where allowed to buy
discounted dollars with which to pay-off their dollar debts.  If indeed firms in Chile in the
early 80s believed that the government would bail them out in event of depreciation, they
were ultimately proven right by the events that unfolded after the peg was abandoned.
In this section we want to test this hypothesis empirically so as to determine to what
extent the exchange rate regime may have played an important part in Chile’s international
borrowing experience.  However the many policies and external conditions prevailing at the
time in Chile make it impossible to separate the effects of the exchange rate regime and
capital controls on the evolution of capital inflows.  Because of this we estimate the effects
of capital controls and the exchange rate regime on capital inflows using cross-country
regressions.  We examine the period of large capital inflows from 1991 to 1997 to explore
the effects of capital controls and the exchange rate regime on the speed of inflows.  Our
dependent variable is the increase in external debt.  For this variable we use two measures:
the increase in the external debt to GDP ratio and the rate of growth of external debt.
We estimate regressions for the increase in debt on the exchange rate regime and the
extent of capital controls, and other control variables that may affect international
borrowing.  The other control variables are three: exchange rate volatility, the rate of
growth of the economy, and the initial ratio of external debt to GDP.20
We compute the volatility of the exchange rate during the period, as the volatility of
the monthly exchange rate, to control for fluctuations in the exchange rate.  Perhaps what
makes a difference regarding the volume of capital inflows is the actual fluctuation of the
exchange rate rather than the declared exchange rate regime.  A highly volatile exchange
rate may prevent investors from taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities to avoid losses
from exchange rate risk.  However, from the point of view of expectations of market
participants it is essential to understand the logic of the authorities when intervening the
foreign exchange market, and hence volatility could exacerbate flows under the
presumption that authorities will intervene as a result of fear of floating.  For this reason we
still think that the declared exchange rate regime is relevant.  The impact of exchange rate
volatility on capital inflows is different if volatility happens in a fixed or floating exchange
rate regime.
Growth is clearly endogenous, and what should affect the increase in borrowing is
the growth potential.  For this reason, the predicted value of growth for the period 1990-
1995 from cross-country growth regressions, from De Gregorio and Lee (2004), was used
as an exogenous variable.  This variable should proxy for the potential of the economy and,
hence, for the demand for international borrowing.
We also consider the initial level of external debt to GDP.
19  This variable could
have either a positive or negative effect on indebtedness.  The negative effect could come
from the fact that high initial level of debt may indicate that the economy may be closer to a
point where solvency could be questioned, which could slowdown the availability of debt.
However, we could observe a positive sign, when a large level of foreign debt may be a
signal that the country is less liquidity constraint, and so it has more funds available to
borrow.
To proxy for capital controls we use the index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2002).
This index is based on four dummy variables.  One to indicate whether the country has
multiple exchange rates, the second the existence of restrictions on current account
transactions, the third is based on restriction on capital accounts transactions and the last
one on the requirement of the surrender of export receipts.  The global index on capital
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forecast and also related to the initial level of debt.21
controls intensity is the first standardized principal component of the four indices.  Chinn
and Ito (2002) are interested in the effects of financial integration, and hence their measure
takes a higher value the more open the country is to cross-border transactions, and hence
this is an index increasing in financial integration.  In contrast, we are interested in the
extent of capital controls, and for this reason we multiply by –1 the Chinn-Ito index, to
have an index increasing in capital controls.  Therefore, we would expect that when capital
controls are effective, an increase in the index (more controls) should result in a decline of
international borrowing and hence the coefficient should be negative.  We also used the
proxy constructed by Quinn (2003), and the results are basically the same, although in that
case we had fewer observations.
To control for the exchange rate regime we use the index constructed by Levi-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).  We consider their de jure and de facto definitions for
their three-way classification (fixed, managed and floating).  To initiate our investigation
we include the intermediate regime together with fixed.  Later on, we separate the three
regimes.
We construct a cross-section of countries with an initial sample of 80 of middle and
high-income countries, but because of data availability we end up reporting regressions for
26 to 57 observations.  This will help us also to check the robustness of the results to
changes in the sample.
The first set of regressions is presented in table 4, where fixed and managed
exchange rate regimes are put together.  The dependent variable is the change in the debt to
output ratio.  Regressions (1) to (4) present the de jure classification, and from (5) to (8) the
de facto one.  The coefficient on the exchange rate regime appears with a positive sign and
is always significant at conventional significance levels.  This evidence confirms that
countries with fixed or managed exchange rate regimes experienced a larger increase in
external debt.  The coefficient on the volatility of the exchange rate is always not
significantly different from zero.
Regarding capital controls, the coefficient of the proxy for capital controls is only
marginally significant, and with the wrong sign, when the exchange rate regime variable is
based on the de facto classification and the growth forecast is excluded (regression (6)).
The result could be due to correlations between the exchange rate regime and the22
pervasiveness of capital controls.  In fact, it is expected that the more controlled is the
exchange rate regime the more likely is the prevalence of capital controls.  However, the
correlation between the de jure classification and the index of capital controls is zero, and
with the de facto classification is only 0.25 in our sample, so the insignificance of the
capital controls variable does not stem from the correlation of controls with the exchange
rate regime.
For the other two variables used in the regressions we found that growth forecast
has the expected sign, although it is insignificant in all the specifications.  On the other
hand, the initial level of debt with respect to GDP is negative, consistent with the idea that
the as debt increases borrowing constraints in international financial markets may become
more relevant.
As a final check to examine whether the irrelevance of some variables is due to
possible correlations with the exchange rate regime, regression (9) excluded the exchange
rate regime altogether from the regression.  As the table shows, the insignificance of
exchange rate volatility, capital controls and the growth forecast remain.
We run the same regressions for the percent change in external debt and the results
were similar, although the exchange rate regime was not significant in some of the
regressions.  The problem may be due to the fact that the fixed exchange rate regime is
classified together with the intermediate.  For this reason in tables 5 and 6 we separate the
three exchange rate regimes using dummy variables.  Both tables report the same
regressions and the only difference is in the dependent variable.  Table 5 presents the
results for the change in the external debt to GDP ratio, and table 6 the results for the
percent change of external debt.
The results are similar to those of 4.  The volatility of the exchange rate and the
growth forecast always result insignificant.  Capital controls only appear marginally
significant in two regressions of table 6, and again with the wrong sign.  On the other hand,
initial external debt to GDP is always negative and significant at conventional levels.
The regressions show that external debt grew more in countries with fixed and
managed exchange rates than in countries with flexible exchange rates.  This is valid for the
de jure  and the  de facto classifications, and for the two alternative measures of the
dependent variables as can be seen in both tables.  These results also hold for the23
regressions that include all the controls and those that only have the exchange rate regime,
and therefore, it holds for the more restricted sample of 26 observations and the enlarged
one with 56 observations.  The only exception is regression (6) of table 6, where we do not
find a significant coefficient for fixed exchange rates, but also inflows are larger in
countries with managed exchange rate than floating.
Moreover, an interesting result that appears in almost half of the regressions is that
the increase in debt was higher in countries with managed exchange rates than in countries
with flexible exchange rates.  This can be seen in the regressions that have a larger sample,
(4), (5), (9) and (10) in both tables, as well as (6) to (8) of table 6.  In the more restricted
sample, the largest increase is in countries with fixed exchange rate.  Although the results
still confirm that the lowest increase in debt was in countries with flexible exchange rates,
the results are less definite when comparing fixed versus managed exchange rates.
This last result may be explained by the fact that managed exchange rate regimes
may be, in some instances, more prone to investors speculating against the exchange rate
regime.  As long as managed exchange rates, such as the one in Chile in the 90s, imply a
limited defense on the exchange rate, investors may speculate against the authority
capabilities to defend the currency, and hence the results should not be a surprise.  This
could lend support to the bipolar view on exchange rate regimes, namely it is better to have
fully fixed or floating exchange rate regimes, and middle grounds are dominated by the
extremes.
Several other estimations were done to check robustness.  First, as the dependent
variable we also used the average balance in the financial account over GDP during 1991-
97, as well as the average change in net foreign assets as reported by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001).  The exchange rate regime never was significant.  We interpret this as an
indication hat the flow that is actually affected by the exchange rate regime is debt, rather
than portfolio flows or FDI.  We also made some changes to the sample, excluding highly
indebted countries, and countries with less than one thousand dollars of per-capita GDP.
These changes reduced the sample between 2 and 4 in the regressions with 26 observations,
and up to 10 observations in the enlarged sample.  There were no changes in the results
with those modifications of the sample.24
Overall, the international evidence reported here shows those countries with fixed
and managed exchange rates are more prone to increases in external debt, and capital
controls do not play a significant role in reducing debt inflows.  The best way to prevent
excessive borrowing is to let the exchange rate to fluctuate rather than to use capital
controls.  More work could be done to check the robustness of our results, but the evidence
presented here is already very persuasive.
6. International Borrowing and Currency Mismatches
Much recent discussion has emphasized that the currency mismatches that may arise
from international borrowing are an important source of international vulnerability.  Firms
and consumers holding dollar-denominated debt, but whose income is not highly correlated
with the exchange rate, see the local currency value of their debt expand relative to their
income and assets following depreciation.  This deterioration in their balance sheet reduces,
or may even reverse, the expansionary effect a depreciation is assumed to have.  With this
in mind, this section presents evidence on the extent of currency mismatches in Chile in
both the banking and corporate sectors.
We start with data on currency mismatches in 1982.  Figure 10 shows the mismatch
between assets and liabilities denominated in dollars in the banking system.  As expected,
there were no mismatches in the early eighties, as regulation forced all domestic loans in
dollars had to be fully backed by liabilities in dollars
20.  It is clear, therefore, that the
currency mismatch that existed in the Chilean economy in 1982 was not on the balance
sheets of the banks, but in the corporate sector.
There is no detailed data on currency mismatches in the corporate sector during this
period.  However some sense of the existing currency imbalances can be obtained by
looking at the sectorial composition of the foreign currency lending of the banking system.
That there was a currency mismatch problem in the corporate sector is evident in table 7.
Considering the first three sectors as tradeable and the rest as non-tradeables, the figures
                                                
20 In Chile regulation regarding currency exposure of the banking system is dictated by the Central Bank.  The
first change occurred with the debt crisis in August 1982, when banks were allowed to have a maximum
exposure to foreign currency of 20% of basic capital (capital plus reserves).  Regulation has been basically the
same until today.  However, in August 1998 the global limit was maintained, but the computation of
mismatches distinguished among currencies.  The weighting of each currency, which assigns factors of 1, 1.5
and 5, was based on the risk classification of countries of origin.25
show that 53% of total loans in foreign currency went to non-tradeable sectors.  We do not
have information on the hedging practices of corporates in Chile, but the large devaluation
of June 1982 caused the bankruptcy of the banking system, triggered by insolvencies at the
corporate level.
Figure 10 shows that by the mid 90s the total dollar value of foreign currency
exposure of banks increased.  However, as figure 11 shows, the magnitudes are relatively
small relative to total assets and therefore do not constitute a major source of vulnerability
in the banking system.  On the whole, the Chilean banking system of the late 90s is not
highly dollarized, a marked contrast with the early 80s.  In 1981, about 70% of total
liabilities were comprised of dollar deposit and foreign debt.  In contrast, in 2003 this was
only 24%, and regulation insured that mismatches are within safe limits given banks’ levels
of capitalization.
As we argue above, a large share of Chilean foreign debt is not intermediated by the
banking sector, but directly by firms.  The  picture painted by the bank data in figures 10
and 11, may therefore provide a partial view of total foreign debt in the economy.  In
addition, as we mentioned above, it is not dollar-debt that matters for financial
vulnerability, but currency mismatches.  It is therefore important to not only know how
much foreign debt there is, but also who holds the debt; in particular, whether firms whose
income is more correlated with the exchange rate are those firms that hold higher foreign
liabilities.  To do this we turn to firm level data on the currency composition of firm
liabilities.
Our data consists of firm-level accounting information for non-financial
corporations in Chile for the period 1993 to 2002.  In addition, we have data on firm
exports and sectors in which the firms operate.  Our main source of information is the
FECU database of the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS).
21  Data on the
currency composition of liabilities and assets is not recorded directly in the FECUS, but is
reported in the notes attached to each firm's Annual Financial Statistics.  These notes are
neither standardized nor available in an electronic format.  Because of this, we start with
                                                
21 The FECU database has standardized accounting data for all firms categorized as Sociedades Anonimas
Abiertas. By law these firms must disclose their accounting information using a standardized format (the
Ficha Estadistica Codificada y Uniforme FECU). We use non-consolidated data, so that investments in
subsidiaries are reported in a separate account and not as a part of the aggregate stock of fixed assets.26
the data on foreign currency liabilities assembled by Benavente et al.  (2003).
22 We then
input data on foreign currency assets and derivatives collected from each of the notes
mentioned above
23.  For our estimates, we use a sample restricted to the non-financial firms
for which foreign-currency data are available.  The size of the sample changes as new firms
are incorporated into the SVS database, but it consists of about 150 firms
The distribution of dollar debt is presented in table 8, where we separate the entire
period in two sub-periods.  The first was the period from 1993 to 1998 of managed
exchange rate and capital controls, and the following, the post-Asian crisis period with
flexible exchange rate that goes from 1999 to 2002.  The table shows that in both dollar
debt is less than 25% of total liabilities over 1993-1998, and that this share declined slightly
in the second sub-period.   The table also shows that firms (and/or lenders) take into
account the elasticity of their income to the real exchange rate when choosing currency
composition of liabilities, as exporters and firms in the tradeable goods sector have a larger
share of their liabilities in terms of dollar debt.
In addition, large firms also hold more dollar debt.  This has three possible
explanations: fixed costs in accessing international capital markets, the size restrictions
mentioned in section 4, and lower costs of a mismatch, since we would expect that large
firms suffer less from fluctuations in their accounting net-worth.  Finally, firms that hold
foreign assets, another proxy for the elasticity of income to the real exchange rate, hold
more dollar debt.  Therefore, as expected or desired, firms that are less vulnerable to
exchange rate fluctuations are also those that hold more dollar debt.
The final panel of table 8 presents simple measures of currency mismatch.  Starting
with the ratio of total dollar debt to total assets, we then subtract the net currency derivative
position of the firm, and then in turn, subtract dollar-indexed assets.  Once assets and
derivative positions are considered, average currency mismatches for Chilean corporates
are below 5% of total assets in the first period, and close to zero in the second periods.
Cowan et al. (2005) confirm that it is this currency mismatch – or exposure – that
makes firms financially vulnerable to a depreciation and not dollar debt.  Using firm level
data, they fail to find a differential effect of depreciations on firms with higher levels of
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composition of liabilities. For more details see Galindo et al. (2003).
23 This dataset is also used in Cowan, Hansen and Herrera (2005).27
dollar debt in Chile
24.  In other words, Chilean firms with higher dollar-debt do not invest
less than their peso indebted counterparts following depreciation.  They argue that this
result does not invalidate the balance-sheet mechanism, but that instead it shows the
importance of using measures of currency mismatch to determine vulnerability instead of
debt measures.  Indeed, as we discussed above, the fact that Chilean corporates match the
currency composition of their liabilities with that of their incomes, means that negative
balance sheet effects are offset by positive competitiveness gains, so that dollar debt is a
poor measure of mismatch.
The fact that even before floating the exchange rate and the elimination of capital
controls currency mismatches in Chilean corporates where minor, lends support to the idea
that firms had a prudent attitude toward exchange rate changes even before it was allowed
to float.  This suggests, in turn, that the exchange rate band did not provide full implicit
insurance to those holding unhedged foreign debt and that a sharp exchange rate adjustment
before 1999 would not have resulted in serious financial problems for the corporate sector.
In addition, more instruments to hedge currency exposure have become available to
Chilean firms since the peso started to float as the FX derivative market has deepened
significantly (De Gregorio and Tokman, 2004).
7. The US-Chile Free Trade Agreement
Chile signed a Free Trade Agreement with the US in 2003.  This agreement
involved some commitments in terms of capital flows, and a relevant issue is whether Chile
could re-impose capital controls, in particular on inflows.  The chapter on financial services
considers the free mobility of capital with no provisions.  However, annex 10-C to the
chapter on investment establishes some margins to the application of capital controls by
establishing the legal actions that investors can take against Chilean authorities in case of
disputes regarding controls on capital movements.
25
In terms of capital controls on outflows, Chile has not used them since the crisis of
the 80s, and even when pressures on the peso were at its maximum in 1998 they were not
used.  But, annex 10-C says that Chile will not incur in liabilities for costs arising from the
                                                
24 These are in line with previous results by Bleakley and Cowan (2002) for 5 Latin American countries, and
more recent results for 8 East Asian economies by Luengnaruemitchai (2004).28
imposition of restrictions on outflows as long as they are not applied for more than a year,
and the restrictions do not “substantially impede transfers.”  Therefore, restrictive and
focalized measures for up to a year are still possible.  But the agreement explicitly excludes
transfers from FDI and external debt payments as agreed in original terms of the loan from
the one-year restriction to submit claims.
The most relevant issue is restrictions on capital inflows, in which case investors
may take legal action when they are impeded to invest in Chile.  However, there are
constraints on these actions.  Chile should not be subject to claims from losses incurred
within one year from the date restrictions are imposed.  The first year can be applied along
the same principles of outflows.  The treaty also establishes that a claim can be submitted
only after one year has elapsed from the loss incurred by the investor, which in fact would
result in two years after the application of the restriction.  In addition, the loss that can be
claimed is limited only to interest losses, and no other costs, such as loss of profits or
business.  There is no class action, and therefore all investors should submit claims
independently.  Therefore, Chile could still impose, although for a shorter period, capital
controls on inflows, although with less degrees of freedom than in the 90s.
However, the main limit to the application of capital controls in Chile was their
workings itself.  In order to encourage domestic investors to invest abroad during the
application of the encaje, most investment abroad was guaranteed the possibility to return
without having to pay the encaje.  This amount is large and current estimates indicate that
about 27 billion of dollars could return free of encaje.  Therefore, these investments have
plenty of arbitrage opportunities in case Chile re-imposes the reserve requirement.
Therefore, Chile is more limited to apply capital controls than in the past.  In
particular the ability to impose controls for a year is more relevant for outflows than
inflows.  The historical experience suggests that transitory controls are more important to
prevent outflows during a speculative attack, rather than on inflows, which require a
longer-term application.  The limitations of Chile to impose capital controls is the
combined result of the FTA with the US, but more important by the same regulations and
guarantees granted during the period of capital inflows.  Regardless the feasibility of
application of controls, the relevant question is their desirability.  In the case of Chile, the
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financial system is strong, there is a credible flexible exchange rate regime--with minimal
reasons for fear of floating (De Gregorio and Tokman, 2004)--, and inflation is low.
Therefore, the arguments used to impose capital controls in the 1990s are much less
important today, and, in addition, as argued in this paper, it is not clear that they even were
effective.
8. Why Chile Did Not Have a Sudden-Stop?
Following the Asian-Russian crisis Chile experienced a sharp reversal in net capital
flows, which has led many observers to use it as example of sudden-stops in capital
inflows.  Total net inflows fell from over 6 billion dollars in 1997 to 0.5 billion dollars per
year during 1999-2000.  As seen in Table 9, this drop is comparable, and in some cases
larger, than that experienced by other emerging economies that underwent capital account
reversals during the 90s.  These events raise the question of Chilean external vulnerability.
Why, despite relatively low levels of foreign debt, low currency mismatches and relatively
high levels of (allegedly) safe foreign direct investment was Chile vulnerable to a capital
account reversal of this magnitude?
In this section we argue that the negative shock to the supply of international capital
played a minor role in the collapse of net capital flows to Chile.  Indeed, the size of the
international liquidity shock, the causes of the adjustment and the mechanism through
which the different shocks  were amplified set Chile apart from other emerging economies
that experienced sudden stops in the late 90s.  We argue that in Chile an initial large current
account deficit, a sharp decline in the terms of trade, a contractionary monetary policy and
the defense of the currency were the factors that triggered the adjustment in capital flows.
In fact, Chile’s situation is better understood as a current account reversal combined with a
sudden-start in capital outflows by domestic residents than a sudden stop in the inflows by
non-residents.
The main lesson from this experience is (once again!) that consistent
macroeconomic policy matters, irrespective of the structure of gross foreign liabilities.  As
we documented above, despite controls on capital inflows Chile had grown increasingly
integrated into international capital markets (a point also made recently by Lane and
Milessi-Ferreti 2004).  As a consequence of this integration – and in much the same way as30
in  Europe in the early 90s – inconsistent macro policy lead to large net capital movements
despite the high share of “safe” FDI in Chilean international liabilities. An additional lesson
is that recent attention to “third” generation currency crisis is justified in terms of what
happened in Asia, but not in Chile.  Indeed, as financial integration increases previous
“varieties” of crisis may become more likely in emerging market economies.
Sudden Stop or Sudden-Start?
In the later part of the Asian-Russian crisis and its immediate aftermath, the period
1998-99, net capital inflows to Chile dropped by close to 8% of GDP.  At the same time,
the external financing conditions for Chile deteriorated, pushing up the cost of international
borrowing.  Figure 12 shows the spread between the returns on Chilean corporate and
public bonds and the rates on US treasury bills.  Between 1997 and 1999, the spread on
Chilean corporate bonds doubled.  Data for public bonds suggests a similar pattern for
sovereign spreads.  The timing of the rising spread on Chilean bonds coincides with large
hikes in the spread on bonds from other emerging market economies, as measured by the
spread aggregate EMBI bond index. The rise of corporate and sovereign spreads in 1998,
and their failure to drop to initial levels even after the current account deficit was closed in
2000 are evidence that, along with many other emerging markets, Chile experienced a
negative shock to the supply of international savings.
Despite similar pattern on spreads and the net capital account, Chile is different
from other countries that experienced sudden stops in the late 90s.  The first is in the level
of country risk measured by the bond spreads.  Even at its peak, risk premia on Chilean
corporate bonds was lower than the average emerging market risk before the Asian crisis
(see figure 12).  Moreover, there are episodes where the corporate bond spread has been
even higher, such as the second semester of 2002, and the domestic consequences were
much smaller than during the Asian-Russian crisis, providing additional evidence that the
problem was not mainly with foreign lending, but with other factors.
Second, Chile ranks low in many of the variables that Calvo et al.  (2004) identify as
determinants of sudden stops, a point made originally by Calvo and Talvi (2005).
According to Calvo et al.  (2004), sudden stops are usually the result of an international
credit shock that is amplified by the interaction between currency mismatches and a real
depreciation.  Faced with restricted access to international credit, currencies are forced to31
depreciate so as to close the gap between the current and capital accounts, with the size of
depreciation depending on the relative size of the tradeable sector.  For those countries with
large unhedged foreign currency liabilities, this depreciation causes large negative balance
sheet effects that amplify the initial shock, and lead to further reductions in output and
expenditure. In Chile, dollar liabilities in the banking sector are small, and the corporate
sector is relatively well hedged as shown in section 6.  Mismatches in the public sector are
also small – even before including copper revenues in the picture (Ministerio de Hacienda,
2003).
The behavior of gross capital flows sheds light on what was happening with capital
flows in Chile at the time of the sudden-stop.  Figure 13 shows the path of gross inflows
and outflows for Chile over 1996-02.  Following the Asian-Russian crisis, total gross
inflows into Chile actually increased, while non-FDI gross inflows remained virtually
unchanged.  Gross outflows, on the other hand, increased substantially, peaking at over 10
billion dollars during 1999.  There is no clear evidence that access to foreign capital was
curtailed, as gross outflows explain the bulk of the collapse in net inflows.
The relative importance of gross inflows and outflows in the Chilean episode is
atypical within sudden-stop episodes in emerging economies.  The last column of table 10
shows the share of the net capital reversal during the sudden stop episodes in emerging
markets that is explained by changes in gross inflows.  In the average sudden stop episode
experienced by emerging economies 98% of the net capital flow reversal can be explained
by changes in gross inflows, i.e. by stops or reversals in the flow of funds from non-
residents.  Since inflows actually increased in Chile in 1998-99, the share explained by
gross inflows is negative. Chile experienced more of a sudden-start in outflows than a
sudden stop in inflows in this period!
The behavior of two groups of institutional investors explains a large share of the
total gross outflows from Chile in this period: pension fund management companies (AFPs)
and banks.
26 Pension funds increased the share of foreign assets in their portfolio from
close to 1% in 1997 to above 10% in 1999.  This corresponds to capital outflows to the
order of 5% of GDP.  As this rising share of assets coincided with a widening of the legal
investment limits on foreign asset holdings for AFPs it is hard to determine whether the
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outflow was driven by the macroeconomic events of this period or it was simply an easing
of a binding regulatory constraint.
The behavior of banks is more interesting.  Banks contributed to capital outflows by
substantially increasing the share of foreign assets in their portfolios.  Starting from less
that 1% in 1997, the ratio of foreign assets to total assets peaked at over 6% in 1999 (figure
14).  This corresponds to an outflow of close to 5% of GDP.  As shown in the figure, banks
also increased their net dollar asset position over this period, taking on more exchange rate
risk.  This suggests that these outflows were not solely the response of banks looking to
hedge rising dollar deposits.  Interestingly, the share of foreign assets in total assets
declined after the peso was floated in 1999, but much before country risk returned to its
pre-crisis levels.  Both the rising net asset position and the timing of the foreign asset spike
suggest that banks took on a net dollar position to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities
that arose prior to the currency being floated in 1999.  In effect, Chilean residents were
betting against an exchange rate policy that tried to minimize depreciations, while in fact
the large negative external shocks pushed the equilibrium real exchange rate upwards.  The
position against the peso that was taken by banks and fear of floating on the part of the
authorities induced the Central Bank to severely tighten liquidity in the inter-bank market
in 1998.
27
Finally, the timing of events also sets Chile apart from countries that experienced
sudden stops. The Chilean peso came under severe pressure in January 1998.  This lead to
an immediate monetary tightening which successfully fended off a depreciation (during
1998 the peso only depreciated 8%).  The international liquidity shock, evident in the
evolution of spreads (figure 12), only began in July-August 1998.  Therefore, in terms of
timing, the original shock come from the exchange rate and monetary policy response.
Exchange rate policy
Following the Asian crisis in 1997 Chile’s terms of trade deteriorated significantly
pushing up the equilibrium real exchange rate.  Concerned with the effects of a nominal
depreciation on inflation, and the loss of credibility that this would entail if the fixed annual
                                                
27 De Gregorio and Tokman (2004) argue that there were no reasons for fear of floating since balance sheet
effects were not enough to cause serious financial distress and the pass-through from exchange rate to prices
was relatively low to fear an outburst of inflation.33
inflation target was not met, the Chilean Central bank set out to minimize the nominal
devaluation and reign in nominal demand.  To do so it implemented a contractionary
monetary policy (figure 15).
28  In part the monetary contraction was also aimed at closing a
large current account deficit.  Since mid 1997 the current account deficit had been
increasing, reaching a peak of about 8% of GDP in 1998, which authorities believed was
unsustainable (figure 16).  Simultaneously the Central Bank intervened in the foreign
exchange market- selling close to 2 billion dollars in reserves in 1998 alone.
The combination of a negative terms of trade shock, rising international interest
rates and contractionary domestic monetary policy led to a substantial slow down in
economic activity.  Output growth fell from over 6% in 1997 and 1996 to 3% in 1998, and
then it declined by 1% in 1999.  Simultaneously, unemployment rose from 5% to over 7%
in 1998 (figure 17).  As in the Obstfeld (1996) currency crisis model (“second” generation),
the rising output cost of the currency defense pushed up depreciation expectations, which in
turn made the defense of the currency increasingly costly.  This resulted in capital outflows
of agents (banks in particular!) wishing to cash in on arbitrage opportunities from the
gradual depreciations during 1998 and 1999.  As we argued before, a gradually
appreciating exchange rate induces inflows. This experience reinforces that argument by
showing that gradual depreciations promote outflows.  Capital outflows by the banks, the
portfolio recomposition by the AFPs and a contractionary monetary policy all combined to
generate a severe credit crunch, depressing consumption and investment and leading to a
large reduction in the current account.
Overall, the Chilean experience was the result of a reversal in the current account,
induced primarily by a very tight monetary policy and domestic liquidity squeeze, a sharp
decline in terms of trade, and a strong defense of the peso.  The pressures on the peso were
caused by international turmoil and a change in the equilibrium exchange rate of Chile,
after the deterioration of external conditions.  In contrast, the international liquidity shock
that caused a sudden–stop in many emerging markets played a secondary role.
                                                
28 These are monthly figures.  Looking at daily figures shows more clearly the extent of the domestic liquidity
squeeze.  In January 1998 went up to 100% in one day and in July and September it reached almost 60%.  The
figure is drawn up to July 2001, since until then the policy interest rates, and most market rates, were set in
temrs of the UF (a Chilean unit of account indexed to the price level).34
9.  Conclusions
What then are the lessons from the Chilean experience with international borrowing?
The first is that domestic financial regulations, in particular regarding the financial
system, play a crucial role in determining the level and composition of capital inflows.
Despite a more restrictive encaje in the early 1980s than in the 1990s, and regulations
limiting bank balance sheet currency mismatches, poor regulation of the banking system in
Chile led to large inflows of debt, a substantial part of which was on-lent to the non-
tradeable sector.  The resulting corporate mismatch and additional problems such as asset
concentration due to related lending and expectations of banks-bailout contributed to the
deep financial crisis that Chile experienced in 1982.
Second, and perhaps the most important lesson, the exchange rate regime plays and
important role in determining debt inflows, currency mismatches and financial
vulnerabilities.  Fixed exchange rates, such as the one Chile had between 1979 and 1982
provide an implicit guarantee to borrowers and lenders alike.  As long as the regime holds,
borrowers and lenders are protected from exchange rate volatility.  If, on the other hand, the
currency depreciates, agents believe that they are entitled to transfers and bailouts from the
government, leading to excessive risk taking ex-ante.  Ex–post they have usually been
proven right, as in the case of preferential exchange rate deals in Chile, or more recently,
through the pesification in Argentina.  A fixed exchange rate regime also makes it very
complicated to introduce prudential regulation for currency mismatches into banking
legislation.  How can you ask banks to insure against an event you are guaranteeing will
never happen?  But the real problem lies beyond banks, and therefore policies must be
consistent with incentives for corporates to avoid excessive mismatches and banks for
monitoring it, which requires careful rules to regulate related lending and implicit massive
guarantees on the banking system.
More generally, rigidities in the exchange rate system may amplify shocks to the
supply of international capital.  In “good” periods, a rigid exchange rate regime provides
implicit insurance to borrowers, reducing the risks of interest rate arbitration.  The risk of
postponing an adjustment, i.e.  allowing the exchange rate to appreciate during a surge of
capital inflows, is an incentive for further capital to flow in while assets still remain
undervalued, putting additional pressures on an appreciation of the currency.  In bad35
periods, delaying depreciations amplifies external shocks by piling higher depreciation
expectations onto an already higher risk premia.
Finally, the encaje at best played a small role in the size and nature of debt inflows
to Chile.  Most studies, show that it did have an effect on the maturity composition of
inflows, but that the magnitude of this effect is small.  On the other hand, there is little
evidence that is had a significant effect on total inflows or on the real exchange rate.
Moreover, the proper functioning of restrictions, which attempted to deter flows in and
encourage flows out, has its drawbacks.  In the Chilean case there is an important stock of
investment that left the country when the encaje was in place, and in order to encourage the
outflow, they were insured to be able to return without the imposition of controls, which
limits the scope for restrictive measures.
In addition, this paper raises a series of additional issues regarding the Chilean
experience.  The first is the role of banks in intermediating capital inflows.  Up to 1999,
banks in Chile intermediated very little international debt.  Post 1999, this seems to be
changing.  One explanation for this is the encaje.  An alternative explanation is the recent
development of the derivatives market, which allows banks to borrow abroad without
burdening themselves or their borrowers with currency risk.  For the development of this
market in turn, the internationalization of pension funds and the volatility that the flexible
exchange rate regime has brought, have been very important.
The second is currency mismatches.  Using firm level data for the late 90s we show
that currency exposure in Chilean corporates was low, and that it fell after 1999.  Bank
level data from 1982, on the other hand, suggest that mismatches in the corporate sector
prior to the crisis in 1983 were sizeable.  Again, the commitment to a fixed exchange rate
coupled with weak regulation induces mismatches.  While the most recent experience
shows that despite some rigidity in the exchange rate, there was no implicit insurance and
not bad loans due to related lending that could have induced excessive currency mismatch
and financial sector fragility.
Third, Chile experienced a substantial slow down in capital inflows in the late 90s.
We argue, that the exogenous international credit shock played a minor role in this reversal.
Most of the action came from a sudden start of outflows not from a sudden stop of inflows.
Therefore, the Chilean case is better described with second-generation currency crisis36
models than with more recent models that center on balance sheet effects.  In Chile, a
negative terms of trade shock and an initially large current account deficit were amplified
by a sharp tightening of monetary policy and an inconsistent exchange rate policy.  The
current account reversal that took place was not accompanied by a sudden stop of inflows
in the capital account, but by a sudden start of outflows.  Consistent with the fact that a
gradually appreciating currency encourages inflows, a gradually depreciating currency
promoted outflows.37
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A 20% reserve requirement is applied to foreign loans.  The reserve is for a minimum period of 90 days and
maximum 1 year.  Pre-payments (merchandise must be shipped within six months) and charges are exempt.
1992 January
The 20% reserve requirement on foreign loans is extended to commercial banks’ sight and term deposits in
foreign currency.
June
The reserve required is increased from 20% to 30%.  The reserve period for Chapter XIV loans is uniformly
set at 1 year and, in the case of banks, the days are counted as consecutive days instead of bank working days.
A liquidity credit line in dollars is established to constitute the reserve.
1995 July
Secondary ADRs (American Depository Receipts) and investments not destined to the formation or increase
of a local company’s social capital are now subject to a reserve requirement in order to broaden the
productive capacity of goods or services, excluding straightforward financial flows.
1996 March
Foreign loans entirely destined to the prepayment of foreign loans which were duly authorized and registered
with the Central Bank are excluded from the reserve requirement while the weighted average terms of the new
loan and the remaining original loan remain similar.
September
The reserve required on firms’ foreign loans contracted by way of bond issues is eliminated when the
financing thus obtained is to finance investment abroad or to refinance liabilities of the firm’s agents or
affiliates abroad.
October
A reserve is established for portfolio investment made according to the stipulations of Chapter XIV of the
Compendium of Foreign Exchange Regulations (CNCI) even when this investment is to constitute or increase
the capital of firms already established in the country if it is not made to increase productive capacity of goods
and services nor to contribute to the firms’ productive operation.  The reserve requirement is still excepted in
the case of investment made to acquire first issue shares on the grounds of an ADR convention.
December
Loans, capital contributions and investment for amounts less than US$200,000 are exempt from the reserve
requirements, but the same agent must not exceed US$500,000 in the past twelve months.  This measure is
eliminated during 1997.
1998 June
The reserve rate on foreign loans, capital contributions and investment is lowered from 30% to 10% for the
first year.  Short-term banking system liabilities (credit lines and the public’s cash deposits) continue subject
to the 30% reserve but two-thirds of the reserve will be remunerated.
August
The reserve requirement is lifted from capital inflows destined to ADR arbitrage transactions in the secondary
market.42
September
The exchange reserve is reduced to zero on all capital inflows.  At the same time, the reserve rate on foreign
currency sight and term deposits and loans is reduced to make the reserve cost in foreign currency the same as
in local currency.
2001 April
The 0% reserve requirement on incoming capital is eliminated.
Loans, investment and capital contributions from abroad
1993 April
The minimum period that capital contributions entering Chile under the stipulations of Chapter XIV of the
CNCI must remain in the country is reduced from three years to one year.
2000 May
The minimum period of one year that investments and capital contributions must remain in the country, as
stipulated in Chapter XIV of the CNCI, is eliminated.
2001 April
The capital account is completely freed by eliminating all remaining restrictions, but keeping the requirement
that financial-type exchange transactions must be channeled through the formal exchange market and the
Central Bank informed of those exchange operations that it decides.
Consequently, prior authorization is no longer needed for capital inflows associated with foreign loans,
investment and capital contributions, the same as for capital outflows associated with capital returns,
dividends and other benefits relating to capital contributions and investments and prepayments of foreign
loans.  The obligation of selling and/or buying foreign currency on the formal exchange market is also
eliminated as well as the restrictions on the currency in which foreign loans may be granted or taken.
2002 January
Financing obtained from foreign loans, investments and capital contributions may be freely used abroad
including the capitalization of any outstanding debt abroad.
2003-2004
More simple requirements are set regarding information on all exchange matters regulated by the CNCI.
Bond issues abroad
1992 May
Residents in Chile are authorized to obtain foreign loans by placing bonds abroad.  Bond issuers must have an
A rating from the Risk Classifying Commission of the Pension Fund Administrators.
1994 April
Solvency levels required for banks and non-banking companies are lowered to BBB and BBB+, respectively.
Moreover, non-banking companies’ minimum amount requirement is lowered from US$ 50 MM to US$ 25
MM, stays at US$ 50 MM for banks, and the need for the Central Bank’s express authorization is eliminated.
1995 November
Funding obtained from bond issues abroad no longer has to be brought back to Chile.  It can be held in a bank
account abroad and used to pay back foreign loans or imports that have been approved and registered with the
Central Bank or it can be invested in foreign instruments abroad.
1998 April43
Minimum amount requirements for bond issues abroad are eliminated and the required international risk
classification of the issuing company is lowered.  The weighted average term of subordinated bond issues
made by banking companies is lowered from ten to five years to come into line with the new Bank Act.
The issue of bonds abroad denominated in Chilean pesos or in UF is authorized, but these cannot be traded
nor offered in Chile and must be disbursable and payable in foreign currency.
1998 June
Funding generated by bond issues, under the stipulations of Chapter XIV, can be put to wider uses thereby
allowing for the issue of Bonds for Infrastructure.
1999 April
Non-banking debtors can issue bonds at maturities of less than four years and the risk classification required
for longer-term bonds is lowered.
2000 May
Bonds denominated in Chilean pesos or in UF can now be accepted as liabilities payable in foreign currency.
Interest paid on these bonds is thus subject to the same tax rate as traditional bonds denominated in foreign
currency (4%).
2001 April
Capital inflows obtained from bond issues are no longer restricted by requirements of prior authorization.
Also the requirements of minimum risk classification of the issuing company and minimum weighted term of
the bond issues are eliminated.
ADR Issues
1990 April
ADR trading is introduced by which residents abroad can acquire shares in Chilean corporations.  Companies
must meet requirements with respect to the minimum amount of the issue and risk classification of the firm,
differentiating between banking and non-banking companies.
1998 April
The minimum amount requirement for issuing ADRs is eliminated and the minimum level of international
risk classification is lowered.
August
To simplify capital movements, the reserve requirement on incoming capital for ADR arbitrage operations in
the secondary market is eliminated.
2000 April
Chapter XXVI of the CNCI is broadened to allow securities to be issued in stock exchanges abroad by way of
instruments other than the ADRs on the New York Stock Exchange.  It also allows company development
funds and real estate investment funds to issue quotas abroad.
2001 April
Restrictions on ADR issues are eliminated.44
Investment abroad
1991 April
To widen investment opportunities, individuals’ own foreign currency or that they have acquired on the
informal exchange market
29 can now be invested abroad, the Central Bank being duly informed.
1997 April
Regulation on Chilean residents’ investment abroad is changed, mainly in that:
a)  prior authorization is no longer required.
b) investment permitted abroad of foreign currency acquired through the formal exchange market is widened
to include granting loans and buying physical assets.
c) remittances must be made through the formal exchange market with the due Central Bank notification.
1998 June
The investment options abroad for foreign currency not acquired on the formal exchange market are now the
same as those authorized for foreign currency acquired on the formal exchange market.
1999 November
Chapter XII of the CNCI is modified to contain the regulation on foreign currency remittances or availability
of funding for amounts over US$10,000 or the equivalent in other currencies.
2001 April
All remaining restrictions are eliminated but transactions must still be carried out through the formal
exchange market and informed to the Central Bank.
Exchange Regulations on Institutional Investors
1992 January
Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs) are allowed to invest a maximum of 1.5% of the total value of the fund
in securities approved by the Risk Classifying Commission.  This limit was gradually increased until, in
January 1999, it reached 16% and the limit on investment in variable-income instruments was 10%.  At the
same time, the minimum risk classification of the investment instruments was also gradually lowered.
1994 November
Insurance companies are authorized to invest abroad in financial investments (10% of their resources in the
case of life insurers and 15% in the case of general insurers) and in nonresidential urban property (up to 3%).
Mutual Funds are also allowed to invest abroad (up to 30% of their resources).
1996 October
Mutual Funds are authorized to invest abroad using foreign currency obtained in the formal exchange market
and the 30% limit is increased to 100% of their total assets.
1999 February
Insurance companies’ limit on financial investment abroad is increased from 15% to 20% in the case of
general insurers and from 10% to 15% in the case of life insurers.
2003 May
                                                
29 The law distinguishes between “formal” and “informal” foreign exchange market.  The formal market is constituted by banks and the
rest is the informal sector.  The main difference has been only the information requirements.45
The limit on Pension Fund Administrators’ investment abroad is raised to 25% and in 2004 it is raised again
to 30%.46
APPENDIX 2: Annex 10-C of the FTA between Chile and the
US.
Special Dispute Settlement Provisions
Chile
1.    Where a claimant submits a claim alleging that Chile has breached an obligation under Section A, other
than Article 10.3, that arises from its imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and transfers,
Section B shall apply except as modified below:
(a)  A claimant may submit any such claim only after one year has elapsed since the events giving rise to
the claim;
(b) If the claim is submitted under Article 10.15(1)(b), the claimant may, on behalf of the enterprise, only
seek damages with respect to the shares of the enterprise for which the claimant has a beneficial interest;
(c) Loss or damages arising from restrictive measures on capital inflows shall be limited to the reduction
in value of the transfers and shall exclude loss of profits or business and any similar consequential or
incidental damages;
(d) Paragraph 1(a) shall not apply to claims that arise from restrictions on:
(i) transfers of proceeds of foreign direct investment by investors of the United States, excluding
external debt financing covered in subparagraph (d)(ii), and excluding investments designed with the
purpose of gaining direct or indirect access to the financial market; or
(ii) payments pursuant to a loan or bond issued in a foreign market, including inter- and intra-
company debt financing between affiliated enterprises made exclusively for the conduct, operation,
management, or expansion of such affiliated enterprises, provided that these payments are made in
accordance with the maturity date agreed on in the loan or bond agreement;
(e) Excluding restrictive measures referred to in paragraph 1(d), Chile shall incur no liability, and shall
not be subject to claims, for damages arising from its imposition of restrictive measures with regard to
payments and transfers that were incurred within one year from the date on which the restrictions were
imposed, provided that such restrictive measures do not substantially impede transfers;
(f) A restrictive measure of Chile with regard to payments and transfers that is consistent with this
Annex shall be deemed not to contravene Article 10.2 provided that, as required under existing Chilean
law, it does not discriminate among investors that enter into transactions of the same nature; and
(g) Claims arising from Chile’s imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and transfers
shall not be subject to Article 10.24 unless Chile consents.47
2.    The United States may not request the establishment of an arbitral panel under Chapter Twenty-Two
(Dispute Settlement) relating to Chile’s imposition of restrictive measures with regard to payments and
transfers until one year has elapsed since the events giving rise to the dispute.
3.    Restrictive measures on payments and transfers related to claims under this Annex shall otherwise be
subject to applicable domestic law.1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
Net International Inves. Position (A-B) -7,402 -16,447 -14,988 -23,471 -28,729 -29,314 -29,510 -27,981
(%GDP) 25.1 90.3 44.7 32.6 39.4 39.0 43.1 41.5
A. Assets 9,080 8,264 15,898 28,517 51,502 52,569 53,137 55,490
1. Foreign Direct Investment 56 103 137 2,460 9,000 11,154 11,905 12,389
2. Portfolio Investment 0 0 0 52 11,402 9,876 10,662 12,988
3. Other Investment (debt) 4,587 4,954 8,687 10,782 16,154 16,429 16,169 14,762
4. International Reserves 4,436 3,206 7,074 15,224 14,946 15,110 14,400 15,351
B. Liabilities 16,482 24,711 30,887 51,989 80,231 81,883 82,647 83,471
1. Foreign Direct Investment 3,982 3,527 10,539 23,656 43,498 45,418 45,082 43,861
2. Portfolio Investment 107 232 598 6,167 10,611 9,187 10,302 11,079
3. Other Investment (debt) 12,393 20,952 19,750 22,165 26,122 27,278 27,263 28,531
Memorandum Item*
External Debt 12,697 21,656 20,655 25,505 34,758 37,177 38,538 40,956
* In the international investment position statistics external debt is mostly included in "other investment", but also in other items, as described in the text .
Table 1: International Investment Position
(millions US$)
Source: Central Bank of Chile(million US$) (% total debt) (million US$) (% total debt) (million US$) (% total debt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1991 2199 11.3 4346 22.3 5658 29.0
1992 3475 16.3 5841 27.3 7239 33.9
1993 3487 15.9 5769 26.3 7353 33.5
1994 3865 15.6 6859 27.7 8541 34.5
1995 3431 13.5 6891 27.0 8636 33.9
1996 2635 10.0 7045 26.8 8862 33.7
1997 1287 4.4 5522 19.0 7829 27.0
1998 1610 4.9 5130 15.7 7672 23.5
1999 1171 3.4 4317 12.4 7145 20.6
2000 2531 6.8 6172 16.6 10236 27.5
2001 2051 5.3 5290 13.7 9944 25.8
2002 2324 5.7 5823 14.2 11591 28.3
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Table 2: Short-Term External Debt
Narrow Definition New Definition  Debt Maturing within a YearIndependent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log (gdp per capita PPP) 0.152 0.161 0.142 0.145
beginning of period (0.016) *** (0.013) *** (0.016) *** (0.013) ***
I(year>2000) 0.006 0.034 -0.003 -0.003 0.012 -0.013
(0.038) (0.038) (0.051) (0.038) (0.036) (0.051)
Chile dummy -0.218 -0.229 -0.242 -0.212 -0.219 -0.238
(0.027) *** (0.024) *** (0.033) *** (0.027) *** (0.024) *** (0.033) ***
Chile dummy 0.222 0.189 0.256 0.281 0.264 0.315
x I(year>2000) (0.039) *** (0.037) *** (0.053) *** (0.039) *** (0.035) *** (0.053) ***
Bank Credit over GDP 0.004 0.004
beginning of period (0.001) *** (0.001) ***
Regression Statistics
Observations 149 198 106 149 198 106
R-squared 0.35 0.34 0.23 0.32 0.31 0.21
Sample Net Capital All Net Capital Net Capital Net Capital
Importers Importers Importers Importers
Source:  Author's calculations based on IFS data.
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Bank Inflows / Total Debt Inflows Bank Inflows / Total non-fdi Inflows
Table 3:  The Role of Banks in Capital Inflows. Is Chile Atypical?
Dependent Variable:Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Fixed and Managed 0.170 ** 0.166 *** 0.148 ** 0.095 * 0.181 ** 0.169 0.184 ** 0.135 **
Exchange Rate (0.068) (0.065) (0.071) (0.059) (0.074) (0.067) (0.074) (0.063)
Exchange Rate 0.111 0.216 0.050 0.255 -0.268 -0.206 -0.350 -0.074 -0.018
Volatility (0.391) (0.389) (0.412) (0.417) (0.390) (0.382) (0.405) (0.413) (0.039)
Capital Controls 0.035 -0.029 0.050 0.052 * 0.028
(0.032) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033)
Growth Forecast 0.553 1.011 0.445 0.965 0.995
  1990-1995 (1.413) (1.391) (1.443) (1.479) (1.442)
External debt/GDP -0.029 *** -0.474 *** -0.360 *** -0.595 -0.385 *** -0.521 *** -0.390 *** -0.617 *** -0.356 ***
1990 (0.087) (0.076) (0.116) (0.059) (0.090) (0.069) (0.122) (0.390) (0.109)
Regression Statistics
R2 0.49 0.58 0.42 0.84 0.49 0.61 0.47 0.86 0.38
No. of Obs. 27 37 29 56 26 34 27 47 31
Notes: *, **, and ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. All regressions estimated with OLS.
Table 4 : Regression Results
Classification de jure Classification de Facto
Dependent Variable: Change in the Debt to GDP ratio (1991-97)Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fixed 0.268 *** 0.249 *** 0.171 * 0.274 *** 0.274 *** 0.215 0.327 *** 0.162 0.287 *** 0.287 ***
Exchange Rate (0.099) (0.064) (0.103) (0.042) (0.042) (0.145) (0.078) (0.143) (0.059) (0.058)
Managed 0.08 0.158 ** 0.091 0.239 *** 0.242 *** 0.184 * 0.242 *** 0.177 * 0.323 *** 0.317 ***
Exchange Rate (0.086) (0.076) (0.099) (0.066) (0.065) (0.102) (0.082) (0.106) (0.059) (0.055)
Floating -0.013 0.05 -0.018 0.17 *** 0.181 *** 0.011 0.108 -0.011 0.169 *** 0.169 ***
Exchange Rate (0.080) (0.071) (0.093) (0.060) (0.057) (0.096) (0.070) (0.100) (0.057) (0.057)
Exchange rate   0.21 0.242 0.071 0.264 -0.232 -0.116 -0.366 -0.128
Volatility (0.361) (0.387) (0.414) (0.420) (0.419) (0.395) (0.427) (0.430)
Capital Controls 0.499 * 0.034 0.053 0.059 *
(0.029) (0.028) (0.350) (0.030)
Growth Forecast -0.423 0.832 -0.36 *** 1.023
  1990-1995 (1.364) (1.408) (0.128) (1.563)
External Debt/GDP -0.358 *** -0.473 *** -0.363 *** -0.594 *** -0.594 *** -0.512 *** -0.384 *** -0.615 *** -0.615 ***
1990 (0.100) (0.075) (0.116) (0.037) (0.037) (0.080) (0.130) (0.039) (0.039)
Regression Statistics
R2 0.59 0.60 0.44 0.84 0.85 0.50 0.62 0.47 0.86 0.87
No. of Obs 27 37 29 56 56 26 34 27 47 47
Notes: *, **, and ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. All regressions estimated with OLS.
Table 5: Regression Results
Classification de Facto Classification de Jure
Dependent Variable: Change in Debt to GDP Ratio (1991-97)Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fixed 1.31 *** 1.058 *** 1.128 *** 0.985 *** 0.988 *** 0.724 1.034 *** 0.87 * 0.927 *** 0.927 ***
Exchange Rate (0.958) (0.244) (0.343) (0.257) (0.255) (0.516) (0.284) (0.474) (0.348) (0.344)
Managed 0.955 *** 0.909 *** 0.925 *** 1.133 *** 1.17 *** 1.193 *** 1.377 *** 1.242 *** 1.407 *** 1.404 ***
Exchange Rate (0.340) (0.290) (0.332) (0.369) (0.349) (0.365) (0.300) (0.350) (0.349) (0.326)
Floating 0.63 * 0.594 ** 0.605 * 0.858 ** 0.867 ** 0.746 ** 0.938 *** 0.757 ** 0.711 ** 0.711 **
Exchange Rate (0.318) (0.270) (0.310) (0.405) (0.400) (0.342) (0.254) (0.330) (0.340) (0.336)
Exchange rate   0.752 0.867 0.777 0.882 -0.889 -0.569 -0.625 -0.06
Volatility (1.433) (1.466) (1.382) (2.588) (1.493) (1.443) (1.416) (2.553)
Capital Controls -0.062 -0.056 -0.101 -0.037
(0.118) (0.106) (0.126) (0.111)
Growth Forecast 1.744 3.677 5.623 4.471
  1990-1995 (5.417) (1.382) (5.547) (5.174)
External Debt/GDP -0.759 * -0.683 ** -0.747 * -0.532 ** -0.532 ** -0.735 -0.898 *** -0.818
* * -0.502 ** -0.502 **
1990 (0.399) (0.286) (0.389) (0.230) (0.229) (0.452) (0.294) (0.429) (0.232) (0.229)
Regression Statistics
R2 0.34 0.23 0.29 0.10 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.15 0.35
No. Of obs 27 37 29 56 56 26 34 27 47 47
Notes: *, **, and ***, significant at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. All regressions estimated with OLS.
Dependent Variable: Percent Change in External Debt (1991-97)
Table 6 : Regression Results






Transportation & Telecomm. 641 174
Financial Services 4744 453
Non Financial Services 1487 n.a.
Source: Arellano (1983)
1993-98 1999-02
Dollar Debt (% Total Liabilities)
Full  Sample 23.6 20.5
Non Tradeable Sectors 13.9 12.8
Tradeable Sectors 34.3 29.2
No Exporters (X<10% sales) 19.4 15.5
Exporters (X>10% sales) 47.7 42.4
Small Firms (assets < median) 12.2 8.8
Big Firms (assets > median) 35.0 32.1
No Dollar Assets (DA<5% assets) 17.7 12.9
Dollar Assets (DA>5% assets) 51.6 45.8
Currency Mismatch (% Total Assets)
Dollar Debt 8.8 8.3
Dollar Debt Net of  Derivative Position 8.5 7.0
Dollar Debt Net of  Derivative Position and Dollar Assets 3.1 0.0
Source: Author's calculations based on SVS data.
Table 8: Distribution of Dollar Debt 1993-2002
Table 7: Financial System Lending by Sector in 1981
(millions US$)∆ net inflows % explained
(%GDP)  by inflows
Argentina 95 -6.0 64.0
Argentina 01 -15.1 92.1
Colombia 98 -6.9 95.6
Ecuador 99 -48.3 84.8
Mexico 95 -10.5 91.5
Peru 97 -8.8 94.3
Indonesia 98 -9.5 102.7
Korea 98 -6.1 177.2
Phillipines 97 -18.5 6.8
Thailand 97 -19.8 100.3
Turkey 94 -7.3 147.7
Turkey 98 -11.4 103.8
Turkey 01 -11.7 106.5
Average (no Chile) -13.8 97.5
Chile 82 -24.5 109.3
Chile 98 -7.6 -39.1
Source: authors' construction based on IFS data.
Note: Sudden stop episodes are from Calvo et al. (2004). ∆net inflows correpond to
the difference between the maximum value of net inflows in [t-3, t] and the minimum
value in [t, t+3], where t is the year of the sudden stop. ∆net inflows are scaled by t-1
GDP
Table 9 : Sudden Stops in Emerging Economies`
Source : Central Bank of Chile
Figure 1: Chile's External Debt by Maturity
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Source : Central Bank of Chile
Figure 3: Financial and Non-Financial Private External Debt 















































Sources  : Central Bank of Chile,  Pension Fund Superintendency (SAFP).
Figure 5: International Investment Position














































Source : Jadresic et al. (2003)
Figure 7
(a) Net Investment Position  (% GDP) (b) Foreign Assets (% GDP)























































































Source: Central Bank of Chile
Figure 8: Nominal Exchange Rate
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1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004Source: Herrera & Valdes (2004), Central Bank of Chile and IFS.
Source: Herrera & Valdes (2004), Central Bank of Chile and IFS.
Figure 11: Composition of Total Liabitlies in the Banking Sector
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Deposits Foreign Currency Foreign Debt Peso and UF DepositsSources: Merry Lynch and JP Morgan
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Gross OutflowsSources: Caballero et al. (2004), Bank Superintendency and  IFS.
Source: Central Bank of Chile
Figure 15: International Reserves and Interest Rates 96-00
Figure 14: Bank Assets and Currency Mismatches
Note: Dollar Assets were calculated as the sum of dollar denominated loans and
foreign assets, and Dollar Liabilities as the sum of dollar denominated deposits and
foreign liabilities. Foreign banks are those in which more that 50% of equity is owned
by non-residents. Foreign assets are: cash in foreign currency, offshore deposits and
offshore investments.











































































(RHS axis)Source : Central Bank of Chile
Source : Central Bank of Chile
Figure 16: Current Account Deficit (% GDP)
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